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Abstract While people in democracies can vote their government out when they are discon-
tent with its policies, those in dictatorships cannot do so. They can only attempt to expel the 
dictator via mass protests or revolutions. Based on a general cause-and-effect mechanism, the 
author analyzes whether such mass protests are more likely when the economic situation is 
poor and vote outs are more likely under bad economic conditions. The empirical analysis 
provides evidence of economic voting in the European democracies. On the other hand, the 
results for the Arab World show that economic revolutionizing does not occur there. For this 
reason, the economics of the Arab Spring are analyzed in greater detail. It can be concluded 
that bad policy is punished in democracies only. Therefore, by using positive analysis, the 
investigation demonstrates the malfunctioning of the political market in dictatorships. 
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Zusammenfassung In diesem Aufsatz wird der Zusammenhang von Abwahl- bzw. Revoluti-
onswahrscheinlichkeit und der ökonomischen Performance untersucht. Basierend auf einem 
allgemeinen  Ursache-Wirkungs-Mechanismus  werden  die  Thesen  abgeleitet,  dass  eine 
schlechte ökonomische Performance zwar die Abwahlwahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, nicht jedoch 
die Revolutionswahrscheinlichkeit, da das Zustandekommen einer Revolution davon abhängt, 
ob das Kollektivgutproblem gelöst werden kann. Die empirische Analyse der europäischen 
Demokratien zeigt, dass eine schlechte ökonomische Performance vor einem Wahltermin häu-
figer mit einer Abwahl als mit einer Wiederwahl einhergeht. Die Untersuchung für Revoluti-
onen und Aufstände in der arabischen Welt dagegen zeigt, dass dort kein solcher Zusammen-
hang besteht, weshalb eine genauere Betrachtung der potentiellen ökonomischen Ursachen 
des arabischen Frühlings erfolgt. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass die ökonomische Per-
formance auch ein Maß für die Qualität der Regierungsarbeit ist, liefert die Analyse ein weite-
res, nicht normatives Argument für die Überlegenheit von demokratischen Systemen gegen-
über nicht-demokratischen, da schlechte Regierungsführung in letzeren nicht unmittelbar be-
straft wird. 
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Economic Voting and Economic Revolutionizing? 
The Economics of Incumbency Changes in European Democracies 




When you think economics, think elections;  
When you think elections, think economics. 
(Tufte, 1978, p. 65) 
 
1.  Introduction 
It can be assumed that the dismissal of a football team’s trainer is more likely if the 
team is unsuccessful – below average. Thus, it seems likely that a greater deviation from av-
erage success has an impact on the probability of being dismissed. There is surely a causal 
relationship. Let us now switch to the political market. The economic voter hypothesis (Key 
1964), which has been convincingly confirmed by various studies (for an overview, see e.g. 
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000) predicts that if a country’s economic situation is good, the 
citizens will vote for the present government and they will vote against it otherwise. Hence, if 
a democratic government is unsuccessful
1, it will be voted out. Note that at this point colle c-
tive action problems are excluded from the initial analysis, namely that there is probably no 
real individual incentive to cast one’s ballot, even if a government does not make a good job 
(Downs 1957).  
By contrast, in non-democratic countries, citizens do not have the option of voting out 
the dictator and can only resort to mass protests or revolution. The aim of the present paper is 
to find out whether mass protests or revolutions are more likely when the economic situation 
is bad, and whether there really is something like “economic revolutionizing”. Therefore, the 
first step is to analyze whether economic voting does exist in European democracies. In other 
words, are less successful governments more likely to be voted out than governments that 
perform well in this (fairly homogenous) sample of countries. Given these questions,  real 
Gross Domestic Product per capita data from 1950 to the present and its effect on government 
changes (on vote outs) was analyzed. Economic voting does indeed exist in this sample. The 
second step was to investigate the Arab world using the same method and the corresponding 
data, which revealed that economic revolutionizing does not occur there – the most important 
result of the paper. These findings are validated when taking a closer look at the Arab Spring 
and possible economic reasons for the protests. One can therefore conclude that the political 
                                                 
1 From now on, “successful” and “good performance” refer to the economic situation. 2 
market is more effective in democracies than in dictatorships – another argument for support-
ing the superiority of democracies, this time by using positive analysis.  
The first innovation is a general cause-and-effect mechanism that underlies both vote 
outs and revolutions. The mechanism consists of a necessary and sufficient condition to be 
satisfied when a vote out or a revolution occurs. Because it is mainly the sufficient condition 
that impedes revolutions, it can be assumed that whether revolutionary events occur or not 
depends on circumstances other than the economic situation. These include the degree of op-
pression, military power, a revolution  occurring in  a neighboring country and support by 
prominent individuals of the opposition (e.g. the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed el-
Baradei in Egypt during the revolutionary action in Egypt in 2011).  
The second innovation is, besides the broad new data set, the introduction of the total 
average deviation (TAD) of the growth trend in the years before elections/protests, as the ex-
planatory variable, instead of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or growth rate itself. Accor-
dingly, the log-linear growth trend of real GDP per capita was shifted parallel to its maximum 
and the deviation of the shifted trend, in other words, the deviation of production potential, 
was used as the subsequent explanatory variable. The assumption that voters consider the best 
possible  situation  when  evaluating  the  prevailing  economic  situation  (Chappell  &  Veiga, 
1998, p. 1) is confirmed by this method. Also new is the binary dependent variable, which 
only measures instances of deselection or reelection (new president/chancellor or not) or revo-
lution/mass protests or not. In the case of voting-functions, the percentage of the votes for the 
ruling party or the opposition party is usually regarded as the variable which requires explana-
tion. By using a binary variable, some information gets lost, but in return, I am able to work 
with a large data set which also includes non-democratic countries where no voting takes 
place.  
The  paper  is,  strictly  speaking,  not  part  of  the  Political  Business  Cycle  literature 
(Nordhaus, 1975), because changes between different voting periods are examined, but not 
the changes within each voting periods.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a short survey of the litera-
ture dealing with economic voting and the economic causes of revolutions. Moreover, the 
general  cause-and-effect  mechanism  is  developed  and  the  theoretical  hypotheses  are  pre-
sented. The following section contains the description of the data and variables and the results 
of the empirical analysis are presented. Additionally, the economics of the Arab Spring are 
analyzed. The final section discusses the research results and concludes.  3 
2.  Background 
What causes a head of the government to be voted out, how do we find this out and 
what have others found out so far? What follows is a short overview of the literature that deals 
with economic voting and with the causes of revolutions. Moreover, a new theoretical ap-
proach is developed.  
The  original  microeconomic  theory  of  voting  behavior  is  the  Rational-Voter-
Hypothesis (Downs, 1957). The Downsian Voter votes for the party which provides him the 
greatest expected net benefit. The Economic-Voter-Hypothesis is more general and macro-
orientated. This theory states that voters have a simple decision rule; if they are satisfied with 
the performance of the current government, they will vote for it again and if not, they will 
vote for the opposition. In turn, this means that the probability of a government being voted 
out of power is supposed to be higher when there is poor economic performance – holding 
other factors constant. This simple but plausible relationship depends on the condition that 
voters believe that the government is responsible for economic development, both good and 
bad (Responsibility-Hypothesis).  
Studies that examine economic influences on votes can be divided into two branches. 
On the one hand, there are popularity functions that measure the popularity of the incumbent 
party; on the other hand vote functions measure the actual number of votes for the incumbent 
party on the election day. Both are functions of macroeconomic variables such as the unem-
ployment, inflation or the growth rates. In addition to economic factors, voters also take polit-
ical factors (domestic and foreign affairs) as well as other factors (scandals) into account 
(Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). However, political and other factors are sometimes difficult to 
quantify or measure, which are common reasons for omitting them from analysis or for only 
including them as dummy variables.  
If one uses macroeconomic variables as the explanatory variables, it is necessary to 
impute sociotropic behavior to the voter. Such behavior means that the voter bases his or her 
decision on the overall economic situation of the country or a part of it, rather than deciding in 
accordance with his or her own economic situation (also known as egotropic decision mak-
ing). Whether the sociotropic assumption makes sense or whether the voter should be better 
thought of as an egotropic decision maker, depends among other things, on the particular cul-
ture. United States (U.S.) citizens, for example, do not tend to blame others if their own eco-
nomic situation has been deteriorating (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994, p. 228). They do not hold 
the government responsible for their own misfortune, but rather for the economic situation of 
the country in general.  4 
By using previous macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables, one must assume 
that voters vote retrospectively (they impute decision making by extrapolating past develop-
ments into the future). Dropping the assumption of retrospective voting and assuming that 
voting is based on forward-looking expectations instead, leads to a diminishing borderline 
between ego and sociotropic behavior (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994, p. 225 f.). Moreover, 
there is a problem with the distribution of information. How can a voter know whether the 
government’s performance is good or bad? Does the press present the situation and does it 
influence people’s views substantially? As Nannestad & Paldam (1994, p. 231 f.) argue, the 
information problem cannot be solved, so that the only solution is to ignore it and assume a 
perfect political market in this context. 
Most studies on economic voting are based on the election results of one country (gen-
erally the U.S.) and there are only a few studies covering more than one country (Lewis-Beck 
& Stegmaier, 2000, p. 184). One of the early studies on the influence of macroeconomic va-
riables on voting behavior in the U.S. was conducted by Kramer (1971), who introduced the 
vote function and analyzed 31 elections in the U.S. He identified the growth rate of real in-
come, consumer prices and changes in the unemployment rate as the decisive macroeconomic 
factors. In his study, the dependent variable is the proportion of votes the president’s party 
gains in congress in a year without an election, compared to one with an election. One result 
of the regression is that the election results in the period 1896 to 1964 were strongly influ-
enced by the real GDP growth rate. The higher the growth rate, the more votes the incumbent 
party received. Kramer’s work was criticized for disregarding the fact that voters may also 
make foresighted decisions. Moreover, his approach lacked a microeconomic basis by not 
considering the behavior of individuals who act as self-interested voters. However, his work 
started a debate not only on the results and their interpretation, but also on the appropriate 
statistical procedures (Fair, 1978, p. 159).  
All of the first twenty studies on economic voting that are based on Down’s concepts 
of a rational voter, simplified it to the hypothesis that voters hold the government responsible 
for economic development. They all assumed a positive relationship between economic de-
velopment and popularity, but, as Mueller (1970) found, the relationship is weaker for high 
economic performance than for low (grievance asymmetry). The big two economic variables 
(i.e. the variables that are significant) of the vote/popularity function are the unemployment 
rate and the inflation rate. Sometimes, the real growth rate explains more than the unemploy-
ment rate (strongly positively correlated, Okun’s law). Lewis-Beck (1988) found that another 
important factor is the number of parties in the ruling coalition; the more parties, the less clear 5 
the responsibility and thus the less strong the effect of the economy on voting behavior. After 
all, in all these cases, it is evident that the results of the within-one-nation studies show that 
economic fluctuations exert an influence on elections. 
The results differ from those of cross-national comparisons in which the explanatory 
variables are seldom significant. Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1990) found a significant effect, 
but they only pooled five countries. Paldam (1991) looked at 17 high-income countries and 
did not find evidence of the economic voting hypothesis. The coefficients for the inflation 
rate, unemployment rate and GDP growth rate all yield the expected direction, but none is 
significant. Powell and Whitten (1993) argued that in cross-nation studies, it is necessary to 
concentrate on the specific political and electoral context. They did just this and the results of 
their study (100 aggregated elections in 19 industrialized countries) were extremely sensitive 
to whether the government was held responsible for economic development or not, so that the 
effects were significant only in countries with a clear allocation of responsibility. Chappell & 
Veiga  (1998)  looked  at  13  Western  European  democracies  and  136  pooled  elections  and 
found, by contrast, that only inflation was significant. In a cross section of 13 European coun-
tries for 1994 Anderson (2000) found retrospective and sociotropic economic voting; the ef-
fect was even greater when the responsibility, and consequently the accountability, is clearer.  
There are also studies on low income countries, in the post-communist societies voting beha-
vior is, for example, strongly influenced by economic developments (see e.g Anderson et al. 
2000, Fidrmuc 2000 or Pacek 1994). Pacek & Radcliff (1995) analyzed 52 elections in eight 
developing countries. The results showed that economic factors are even more important in 
poor than in rich countries. Wilkin et al. (1997) confirmed this finding. Thus, they concluded, 
”Regardless of the complexities of the political context […] voters around the world find a 
way of translating economic demands into partisan support”  (Wilkin, Haller & Norporth, 
1997, p. 314).  
The question is whether they do likewise in non-democratic countries where there are 
in fact no voters, but only potential revolutionaries. There are far fewer surveys on what I 
refer to as economic revolutionizing than on economic voting. One reason is that revolutions 
are much rarer than vote outs, so that the data sets are much smaller. This is because scientists 
often conduct case studies, such as on the French revolution (see e.g Skopol 1985), in order to 
examine causes. Minier (2001) found that the “demand for democracy” increases with per 
capita income. In the tradition of Lipset (1959), Huntington (1991) and Barro (1996), she in-
vestigated whether democracy is a normal good or not, i.e. if more wealth automatically in-
creases the demand for democracy. Her results revealed an increase in the probability of a 6 
democratic movement with increasing GDP. However, the significantly positive effect is only 
observable up to a per capita income level of approximately $ 5000 a year (Minier, 2001, p. 
1002). Focusing on revolutionary activities, there is the deprivation theory of Gurr (1970). He 
explained revolutionary activities as the result of comparisons between people’s actual situa-
tion and one situation that would be possible with better or more effective policies.
2 This 
theory means that a poor economic situation makes a revolution more likely, exactly what I 
examine in section 3.4.  
When examining causes of revolutions and vote outs, it would be helpful to assume a 
general mechanism that underlies both. I assume the following mechanism as a general cause-
and-effect-mechanism (Fig. 1). In the following section the  similarities and differences  be-
tween the conditions relating to a dictatorship or a democracy are explained.  
Necessary condition  Sufficient condition  Result/effect 
Cause (social, economic, political 
factors) 
Solution of the collective-action-
problem 





A sufficient condition for a  vote out or a revolution is that collective action (CA) occurs. 
However, if there is no individual incentive to participate, the CA-problem occurs leading to a 
social dilemma in which collective and individual rationality diverge. Even if the entire popu-
lation wishes to get rid of the government/the dictator, this does not automatically lead to in-
dividual action. Individual action is only rational when the benefits exceed the costs. In case 
of a vote out or a revolution, the participation of one individual does not exert a significant 
effect on the success, but on the other hand, everyone (also non-participants) benefits from the 
collective good of a new government/successful revolution or vote out. By contrast, the costs 
of participation only devolve on those who participate. While the costs of casting ones vote 
are small, the costs of participation in mass protests are high. It is possible to get injured, ar-
rested, tortured or even killed (as in Syria at the time of writing). In democracies, the solution 
of the CA-problem is solved if one assumes a small selective benefit such as everyone wish-
ing to fulfill his civic duty. The solution relating to revolution -participation is much more 
problematic, not only because of the higher costs, but also because of the first-mover-problem 
(see Olsson-Yahouzis, 2010, p. 293 ff.). If the latter could be solved, it would be possible to 
transform the social dilemma into a coordination problem, whose solution demands a focal 
                                                 
2 See also Bloch (1986).  
Figure 1: Mechanism in democracies and dictatorships 7 
point (Schelling, 1980) or coordination.
3 This in turn depends on the dictator’s
4 behavior; the 
greater the oppression, the smaller the chance of overcoming the CA-problem. One can con-
clude that the sufficient condition for vote outs and mass protests, namely the solution of the 
CA-problem, is always satisfied in democratic countries (because it is easy to solve it there). 
On the other hand, it is quite difficult to solve it in dictatorships and so that it could prevent 
revolutions.  
The necessary condition can be assumed as to be revolution or vote-out potential. It 
exists when people are discontent and it depends, among other factors, positively on inequali-
ty, a low degree of freedom, low economic performance, poverty and the unemployment rate. 
Because the degree of freedom is relatively low in dictatorships, there is always a positive  
and generally substantial revolution potential and that is why, contrary to the sufficient condi-
tion, the necessary condition is almost always satisfied in dictatorships. However, this positive 
revolution potential only culminates in mass protests when the sufficient condition is satisfied, 
i.e. when the CA-problem is solved, and that also depends on the behavior of the dictator. If 
there is a solution to the problem, they then attempt to get rid of the dictator through mass 
protests, revolutions or by fighting for more rights and institutional reforms. In many coun-
tries which are classified as not free, there is positive revolution potential, but no revolution 
occurs (e.g. China). I believe that in such countries, the sufficient condition is not satisfied, 
because the regime is able to keep the expected likelihood of punishment sufficiently discou-
raging and tries everything to impede people in their efforts to coordinate protests. In demo-
cracies, on the other hand, solving the CA-problem is much easier because of the low costs. 
While in dictatorships an occurrence of a revolution depends mostly on whether the CA-
problem could be solved, in democracies it depends on the necessary condition, which is for 
example satisfied when the economic situation is poor. People can vote out a government 
which does not generate sufficient wealth. 
Based on the above considerations and assumptions, the probability P of a revolution 
or a vote out in country c in year i can be expressed as (1), in which the TAD (the total aver-
age deviation of the real GDP per capita from the shifted trend, see Section 3.1. for the calcu-
lation) is a measure of the economic performance. 
(1)                              
                                                 
3 If thousands of people are at the same place at the same time, the probability of being punished and therefore 
the costs diminish (Möller, 2011). 
4 The dictator need not be a single person, it could also be an elite group. 8 
The higher the TAD, the greater the gap between the current economic situation and the best 
possible one, so that a high TAD means bad economic performance.    is a vector of other 
variables that influence a voting out or a revolution (such as inequality, freedom, scandals). 
Unfortunately,    could not be calculated, because of missing variables as explained below. 
Therefore, the estimation equation would be (2). 
(2)                              
Because the sufficient condition, namely the solution of the CA -problem, is always satisfied 
in democracies, the TAD has a positive impact on the vote-out probability. On the other hand, 
in dictatorships, the sufficient condition is seldom satisfied, so that the TAD has no significant 
effect on the probability of a revolution or protests occurring. Thus, the hypotheses are H1 
and H2, which are verified in the next section. 
Hypothesis H1:         in the European democracy sample. 
Hypothesis H2:         in the Arab World sample. 
3.  Analysis 
In order to determine whether economic voting and economic revolutionizing do real-
ly exist, I examine two regionally confined areas, the democratic European countries and the 
mostly
5 non-democratic Arab World. The next section deals with the data, the variables and 
the empirical analysis. The final part of this section refers to the Arab Spring. 
3.1.  Data and Variables  
How does one define success? The first important problem to be solved is how to 
measure the success of a government. What is considered as good government? What va-
riables are directly or indirectly influenced by its policies? There are several variables which 
meaningfully measure the economic situation, such as the unemployment rate, the inflation 
rate or GDP. I have selected the latter real GDP per capita (rGDPc). There are various reasons 
for using rGDPc as the explanatory variable. The main reason is that GDP is available for 
almost every country, even for non-democratic ones, and for long, retroactive time period. 
Furthermore, the measure is a good indicator of people’s overall economic situation. Thirdly, 
it is strongly influenced by the quality of the government’s economic policy (even if lagged), 
or at least, I assume this to be the case (responsibility hypothesis, see, for instance, Nannestad 
                                                 
5 All 24 Arab countries are classified as either “not free” or “partly free” (Freedom House, 2011).  9 
& Paldam, 1994). The data on GDP is collected from the Penn World Tables from 1950 to 
2009 (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2011).  
In order to test the first hypothesis, I focused the research on European democracies, 
entailing 34 countries. I argue that the European countries can be regarded as homogenous (at 
least to some extend) and that the economic-voting effect might therefore be fairly consistent. 
Former socialist countries such as Poland are included in the sample only from 1990 onwards. 
In testing the first hypothesis, it is necessary that elections take place. I define the dependent 
variable as 0=reelection or 1=deselection. A deselection is defined as a change of the head of  
government, on the condition that it belongs to another party, that is, other than the previous 
one. Accordingly a change in the ruling coalition, as occurred in Germany in 2009, when the 
ruling coalition changed from CDU and SPD to CDU and FDP and Angela Merkel remained 
chancellor, is not defined as a vote out. If the vote out is caused by a vote of no confidence, I 
designate this as “1”. One can argue that a vote of no confidence is not exactly the people’s 
vote and I agree with this objection. However, I also believe that parliament should function 
as the people’s agent and therefore, it could possibly be considered as a vote out. The sample 
consists of 359 elections: 202 reelections and 157 vote outs.
6  
In order to test the second hypothesis, I consider  the Arab World. The Arab World 
contains 24 countries when categorized by language.
7 Again, I assume that these countries are 
homogenous in at least some respects. Therefore, I exclude Israel from the data set, because 
of the two-in-one-state difficulty. Excluding Israel from the data set yields 23 Arab countries 
for study. The binary variable is a revolutionary event (=1) or no revolutionary event (=0), 
instead of a reelection and vote out. A revolutionary event is defined as a mass protest against 
a dictator (against the ruling party) or an upheaval that is not arranged or initiated by another 
country. This definition does not apply, for example, to  the overthrow of Sadam Hussein in 
2003 by the U.S. The sample consists of 172 observations: 147 with no event s and 25 with a 
revolutionary event.
 8 
The rGDPc is a variable that is non-stationary, so that it must be transformed. I take its 
natural logarithm into account, so that the stochastic trend is eliminated. In order to eliminate 
the deterministic trend as well, I use the deviation of the log(rGDPc) from the log-linear trend 
                                                 
6 The dates on which the elections took place come from “Parties and Elections in Europe” (Nordsiek, 2011). 
7 Another possibility would be a categorization according to a political criterion, that is to say, to take all me m-
ber states of the Arab League. Compared to a categorization according to the language criterion, one  obtains the 
same countries except for Chad, Eritrea and Israel (the Palestinian Territories are a member state of the Arab 
League). 
8 The data to 2007 comes from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), which belongs to the Polity IV Project 
of the Centers for Global Policy, George Mason University. For the Protests’ data in 2010/2011; see Hanelt & 
Bauer (2011).  10 
of the rGDPc. Moreover, I shift the trend in parallel to its maximum for each country to avoid 
positive and negative deviation. As a result I obtain the country-specific total deviation (TD) 
of the shifted trend for each country for each year. As elections do not take place at the same 
time in different countries, a panel-estimation was not possible (for this reason, I could not 
use country or time fixed effects). In order to determine whether the GDP in the years before 
elections has an impact on the probability of being reelected, I built the average of the TD in 
the years before an election. For the denotation, see Table 1. 
 
i  election dates (years) 
i+1  year in which new government is in office 
e  event years (revolutionary action, mass protests) 
c  country 
     log(rGDPc) 
      country-specific linear trend of the log(rGDPc) 




See (3) for the total average deviation (TAD) of the shifted trend in the years before the elec-
tion. Note that if the voting period is shorter than four years, I use the average of the years 
before, including the first year of the deselected (or reelected) government.  
 
(3)                     
 
 
    
     
   
 
Whether a reelection or a vote out takes place, is denoted as a dummy-vector, see (4).    dis-
plays the vote-out potential, see (1) and (2). 
(4)            
                         
                         
Analogous to this proceeding, I do the same for the non-democratic countries, where two im-
portant problems arise. The first is that there are no elections and therefore no vote outs. As 
mentioned above, I perceive mass protests or revolutionary events as vote outs, because mass 
protests against the dictator act as a signal of dissatisfaction (signal of potential deselection) 
with the government (here: dictator). The second problem is that the reference years, in which 
no protests take place, are not as easy to define as the reelection years. I therefore proceed as 
Table 1: Definitions of the variables 11 
follows. If there was a mass protest in, for example, 1960 in country C (and only in C), I de-
fine this as a “1”. As the reference group (“0”), I use all other countries of the Arab world in 
the year 1960. There were 25 cases of mass protests of which 16 belong to the Arab Spring.
9 
The calculation of the TAD is analogous to the proceeding regarding the European democra-
cies (see Table 1 for definitions) and is denoted as follows:  
  
(5)                     
 
 
    
     
   
 
(6)            
                            
                           
The following problem also arises. If, in one country, the deviation of the trend is large be-
cause of a high peak, the deviations from the trend are always high, and on average higher 
than in other countries. Thus, if in one country, 0.2 is the highest deviation, it could be 0.9 in 
another. Pooling these variables may lead to incorrect or biased results. One way of solving 
this problem is to use the percentage decrease or increase in the (average) deviation of the 
shifted trend. Good performance means that the deviation of the trend is lower than before. 
Conversely, the government performs badly when the deviation increases. An advantage of 
this method is that the government could perform well when the outcome is bad, i.e. the devi-
ation is high in this case and they had bad starting conditions. A disadvantage of this method 
is that one must assume that the potential voters rate the government for a change and not for 
the situation itself. This does not seem to be a realistic view. Another method might be the 
division of the average deviation by the maximum average deviation, in order to place the 
variables between one and zero (in order to normalize the explanatory variable). However, I 
do not think that people are really able to weight the deviation. The potential solutions to the 
problem described above are even worse than the problem itself, so that I use the TAD (see 
(3) and (5)). Here, I do not assume that the people base their voting decision on the current 
growth-rate or on anything similar; I merely assume that the GDP is a good indicator of many 
different developments, the economic situation and so on. 
3.2.  Results for European democracies 
In order to determine whether the probability of being voted out is affected by the 
TAD, I considered different models and estimation methods. Because the dependent variable 
                                                 
9 The calculation of the TAD for the 16 cases that belong to the Arab Spring differs slightly (because the GDP 
data for 2010 and 2011 are not available) and is denoted as                 
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is binary, it is obvious that a Logit-Model
10 is the right choice. The results (Table 2, Column 
2) indicate a positive effect of the TAD on the probability of being voted out (            ).
11 
The effect is significant at the 1 percent level. McFadden’s R-squared is fairly small, indicat-
ing omitted variables. While omitted variables in OLS
12-estimations only constitute a problem 
when correlated with the explanatory variables, in  Logit-Models, there is a problem even 
when they do not correlate. As a result, the estimators are biased and inconsistent. One solu-
tion to this problem is to add more explanatory variables, but these are not available for the 
Arab World sample. Therefore, in order to avoid the missing variable problem, I use a Linear 
Probability-Model (LPM) for the estimation, so again, the dependent variable is a binary vari-
able. The results are also shown in Table 2 (Column 3). One can see that the TAD has a posi-
tive significant effect on the voting-out probability at a one percent level (          ). Because 
the model would be heteroscedastic (the variance of a binary variable is not constant, but de-
pendent on the explanatory variable) it is necessary to use White error terms to avoid ineffi-
ciency and biased standard errors.  
Sample: European Democracies 
Dependent Variable   Model – Method 
VOTE OUT (binary variable)  ML – Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing) 
LPM – LS (White Heteroskedas-
ticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
& Covariance) 
TAD   2.05 *** [0.765]  0.5   *** [0.178] 
Constant  -0.67 *** [0.176]  0.35 *** [0.041] 
(Mc-Fadden)      0.015  0.02 
Akaike/Schwarz-criterion  1.36/1.38  1.43/1.45 
LR-Statistic/DW-Statistic  7.42/   /1.8 
S.E. of regression  /  0.49 
Prob (F-statistic)  /  0.00 
Obs. with dep.=0/1        total Obs.  202/157                         359  202/157                         359 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
 
 
In an LPM model, the predicted likelihood could be below zero or above one. Furthermore, it 
is not realistic to assume a linear relationship, because this would imply that an increase in 
deviation from the trend by the same amount, has the same effect on the probability of being 
voted out, regardless of whether it describes a ten percent increase at a high or a low level. 
                                                 
10 I could not use a Probit-Model, because this would require a normally distributed explanatory variable and 
this is not the case.  
11 Using the relative average deviation (RAD) or the percanted change of the deviation (PAD), the effect is in-
significant in both estimations. 
12 Ordinary Least Squared 
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Because of these problems, it is not possible to interpret the coefficients, but one can validly 
state that there is a significant effect. The higher the deviation, the more likely a vote out.  
In order to establish the dimension of the effect, I change the direction of the estimation, so 
that the question would be: Is the TAD significantly influenced by the dummy-vector defined 
in (4)? See (7) for the estimation equation and Table 3 for the corresponding output. 
(7)                          
 
Sample: European Democracies 
Dependent  
Variable:  
Method  Method  Dependent  
Variable: 
Method 
TAD  LS  LS  LOGrGDPc  LS  
Vote out  
(binary) 
0.04***  [0.015]  0.028 *** [0.01]  Vote out  
(binary) 
-0.028 *     [0.015] 
Constant  0.16 *** [0.01]  0.037*** [0.009]  Constant   0.422 *** [0.128] 
TAD(-1)  /
  0.724*** [0.035]
  LOGrGDPc(-1)   0.96 ***   [0.013] 
    0.02  0.55      0.94 
Akaike/Schwarz-
criterion 
-1.067/-1.045  -1.86/-1.83  Akaike/Schwarz-
criterion 
-1.1/-1.07 
S.E. of regression  0.14  0.095  S.E. of regression  0.139 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.01  0.00  Prob (F-statistic)  0.00 
DW-Statistic  0.55  1.79  DW-Statistic  2.08 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
 
 
It is evident that if a vote out takes place, the TAD is 0.04 higher compared to the TAD before 
a reelection. This effect is significant at the one percent level. The intercept is also significant-
ly different from zero. However, as one can also see, the value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) 
statistic is close to zero, indicating positive autocorrelation. This is not surprising, because the 
depended  variable,  the  TAD,  includes  business  cycles,  so  that        is  dependent  of  the 
       and so on. The estimators still remain unbiased and consistent, but they are no longer 
efficient, and also, the standard errors are biased. In order to solve the serial correlation prob-
lem, I add the lagged TAD (TAD(-1)) and exclude the cases in which the TAD(-1) refers to 
countries other than the TAD. The results are shown in Table 3 (Column 3). The R-squared is 
much higher when adding the lagged TAD, but still quite low (0.55). Moreover, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is 1.79, so that one cannot reject the 0-Hypothesis at the five percent level. 
Assuming that the voters are myopic and that they base their decision on the actual economic 
situation and not on a possible situation, one can also estimate whether the log(rGDPc) is sig-
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nificantly different in the election year, irrespective of whether a reelection or a deselection 
takes place (Table 3, Column 5) To control for serial correlation, it is necessary to add the 
log(rGDPc(-1)). The Durbin-Watson statistic no longer indicates serial correlation. The R-
squared is almost one, which is explained mainly by the lagged GDP. However, it is also true 
that the log(rGDPc) is significantly (at the 10 percent level) lower before a reelection, com-
pared to the situation in which a deselection takes place.  
When comparing the reelection sample with the deselection sample, the same result 
occurs; the mean of the TAD before a vote out is 0.21. This is much higher than the mean of 
the TAD before a reelection, which is 0.16. The non-parametric Wilcoxon test (test for equali-
ty of the medians) rejects the 0-Hypothesis at the 10 percent level. Moreover, the mean of the 
rGDPc  in  reelection-years  is  higher  than  the  rGDPc  in  the  deselection-years  (20.539  > 
17.217). 
Therefore one can safely state that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the two samples, and indeed a kind of economic voting in the European country sample, 
namely that a high deviation of production potential reduces the reelection chances or that 
good performance measured by the rGDPc increases the reelection chances. Is there a similar 
pattern in the non-democratic countries, specifically in the Arab world?  
3.3.  Results for the Arab World 
The Logit-estimation of the Arab World sample indicates that there is no economic re-
volutionizing, because the TAD coefficient is not significantly unequal to zero (see Table 4, 
Column 2). Because of the omitted variable problem mentioned above, I applied an LPM es-
timation with White standard errors, which also indicates no effect (Table 4, Column 3).  
Sample: Arab World 
Dependent Variable:   Model – Method 
REVOLUTIONARY EVENT  
(binary variable) 
ML – Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing) 
LPM – LS (White Heteroskedas-
ticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
& Covariance) 
TAD   -1.262       [0.915]  -0.104        [0.107] 
Constant  -1.341 *** [0.353]   0.186 *** [0.051] 
(Mc-Fadden)     0.018  0.01 
Akaike/Schwarz-criterion  0.84/0.87  0.76/0.8 
LR-Statistic/DW-Statistic  2.53/  /2.19 
S.E. of regression  /  0.35 
Prob (F-statistic)  /  0.16 
Obs. with dep.=0/1      total Obs.  147/25                           172  147/25                           172 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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To be sure that there is no effect, I estimate the other way round, that is, estimation equation 
(8), see Table 5. The DW-statistics indicate serial correlation (Column 2), so that I add the 
lagged TAD, see Table 5 (Column 3). The serial correlation problem has been solved and the 
coefficient of the protest dummy-vector remains insignificant, even when using the rGDPc 
instead of the TAD (Table 5, Column 5). The non-parametric Wilcoxon test also yields no 
statistically significant difference between the TAD, when comparing the two samples.  
(8)                           
 
 
Sample: Arab World 
Dependent  
Variable:  
Method  Dependent  
Variable: 
Method 
TAD  LS  LOGrGDPc  LS  
Revolutionary 
Event (binary) 
-0.11       [0.079]  -0.09       [0.078]  Revolutionary 
Event (binary) 
-155.288    [569.836] 
Constant  0.405 *** [0.03]  0.322*** [0.043]  Constant   -244.513   [172.064] 
TAD(-1)  /
  0.208*** [0.075]  LOGrGDPc(-1)   1.067 ***   [0.011] 
    0.01  0.054       0.99 
Akaike/Schwarz-
criterion 
0.822/0.859  0.79/0.85  Akaike/Schwarz-
criterion 
17.67/17.73 
S.E. of regression  0.36  0.36  S.E. of regression  1645.935 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.16  0.01  Prob (F-statistic)  0.00 
DW-Statistic  1.60  2.03  DW-Statistic  1.79 




If there is no economic revolutionizing, then the question would be: What other reasons are 
there to start a revolution (revolutionary event, protests)? Why do people in the Arab World 
demonstrate in some countries and in others not?  To find answers to these questions and to 
identify protest (or social unrest) factors, I consider at the Arab world data and some variables 
of interest. 
3.4.  The Arab Spring  
In the Arab World, in 16 of the 23 countries, there were (or still are) protests against 
the government or at least there were (are) protests in which demonstrators encourage politi-
cal reforms. These protests started at the end of 2010 in Tunisia, moved on to Egypt and 
Table 5: Relationship between revolutionary probability and TAD/GDP 
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spread to large parts of the Arab World. These events referred to as the Arab Spring
13. I took a 
closer look at the data to see if the countries where protests took place differ from those where 
no protests occurred. Figure 2 shows the rGDPc in the 23 countries. The upper line displays 
countries where protests took/take place (P-Subgroup) and the lower line, countries where no 
protests took/take place (NP-Subgroup). It is evident, that there were no protests in particular-
ly rich or  particularly poor countries. The P-Subgroup, by contrast, reveals an essentially 






A particular interesting fact is that Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon are the rich 
countries in the NP-subgroup. This is the case even by comparison to western democracies, 
and it is mainly because they produce oil. The average rGDPc in these three countries in 2009 
is approximately $ 75.000 (int., PPP), which is very high. These figures are nearly a hundred 
times higher than the average rGDPc ($ 800, int., PPP) of the other four countries of the NP-
Subgroup (Somalia, Eritrea, Chad and the Comoros). One can therefore assume that people in 
the latter four countries are unable even to fulfill  their basic needs. Hence, it is implausible 
that they are able to organize themselves for political protests. The present appalling hunger 
crisis in the horn of Africa supports this assumption. On the other hand,  in extremely rich 
countries, people are economically satisfied, so that they are possibly not interested in fighting 
for institutional reforms. However, that would only be the case when most of the people bene-
fit from the high rGDPc. To make a statement about the income distribution, the Gini-Index is 
required. However, for the NP-Subgroup the Gini-Index is not available, except for Chad and 
the Comoros. In Chad, the Gini-Index is approximately 0.4, which is very similar to the  P-
Subgroup (the smallest Gini-Index in the P-Subgroup is 0.321 for Egypt, and the highest is 
0.409 for Morocco). In the Comoros, by contrast, the Gini-Index is 0.643, which is extremely 
                                                 
13 The term “Arab Spring” goes back to the Prague Spring in 1968.  
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high, indicating that the income (or wealth) of the society is very unequally distributed. After 
all, one cannot validly state that the two subgroups, protest-countries and no-protest-countries, 
differ from each other in terms of the Gini-Index.  
Another starting point for explaining the occurrence of protests could be the degree of 
democracy. Is it especially low in countries where people went out on the streets? In the P-
Subgroup, the Freedom-House-Indicator is on average 5.59 and in the NP-Subgroup 5.57. The 
Polity IV democracy indicator is quite similar in the two samples also (the higher the index, 
the more democratic the country, see Table A1 in the appendix). Moreover, a combination of 
the rGDPc and the degree of democracy does not indicate any relationship, as Figure 3 shows. 
The NP-Subgroup contains rich or poor strongly authoritarian countries as well as rich or poor 








The comparison of all other considered variables (e.g. the unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
Human Development Index) does not deliver any explanation of protest occurrence. Some-
times, it is conditioned by the missing data. After all, some reasons for the “Arab awakening” 
were found in the literature as follows. 
The generally “low coverage, quality and accessibility of data” in the Arab countries 
makes it difficult to examine economic causes of the protests, as Breisinger et al. (2011, p.1) 
mention. Nevertheless, they do say something about “the potential role of economics in the 
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Figure 3: rGDPc and the degree of democracy in the Arab World 18 
dards in at least 13 of 18 Arab countries.
14 A relatively high increase in dissatisfaction with 
living standards could be observed in  Egypt, for example which is also the country with the 
largest number of dissatisfied people in absolute terms in the Arab World. On the other hand, 
in Tunisia, where the protests had started, dissatisfaction with living standards has decreased 
over the last few years. However, I do not believe this yields explanation of the protests. Food 
security is the next issue that Breisinger et al. (2011) considered. They observed a decline in 
food security in most Arab countries, which goes hand in hand with the general increase  in 
food prices. They assumed that declining food security and declining satisfaction with living 
standards both played decisive roles. Besides these subjective indicators, they also looked at 
objective factors. Despite high growth rates and poverty reduction between  1990 and 2010, 
especially between 2005 and 2010, the child malnutri tion rate and the youth unemployment 
rate increased (from 20 to 30 percent, and from 20 to 35 percent). When poverty reduction is 
not successful regarding child malnutrition, it is referred to as “Arab Poverty-Nutrition Puz-
zle” (Breisinger et al., 2001, p. 2). If this is the case for every Arab country, we do not consid-
er it a reason for the existence of protests in some countries and not in others.  
Another cited factor is a high youth unemployment rate. This can be traced back to the 
“Arab youth bulge”. This means that approximately 20 percent of the population in the Mid-
dle East and North African Region are between 15 and 24 years old (Assaad & Roudi-Fahimi, 
2007, p. 1). While in developed countries, a third of the population is under the age of 25, in 
the Arab Region the figure is 54 percent (Mirkin, 2010, p. 11). Many critics in the literature 
hold the “youth bulge” responsible for the poor economic situation and for conflicts in general 
(see e.g. Urdal, 2004). However, I argue that the “youth bulge” could only explain the pro-
tests, if it is observed in the countries where protest occurred. This is not the case, as a simple 
example documents. The youngest country in the Arab World is Somalia, with a median age 
of 17.6 years and 64 percent of the population under 25 years (Mirkin, 2010, p. 11 and p. 33) 
and yet, Somalia is one of the countries where no protests took place. On the other hand, in 
the rich countries of the NP-Subgroup, the population is not as young as in the rest of the 
Arab World. In Qatar, only 34 percent and in the United Arab Emirates, only 31 percent are 
under the age of 25, which is even less than in the rest of the world. This fact supports the 
thesis that the “youth bulge” had an impact on the outbreak of the protests and therefore, that 
“economic revolutionizing”, or “economic protesting” in general, does exist. Yet, if economic 
reasons are the only ones explaining why people in countries with authoritarian regimes dem-
onstrate for democracy, one has to observe revolutions in many other countries. For example, 
                                                 
14 The data is available for only 18 countries. 19 
North Korea and Turkmenistan are at the lower end of the democracy scale and both have a 
relatively small rGDPc. However, there is no revolution. As Tullock (1971) pointed out, there 
is no individual incentive to demonstrate, as long as the potential improvements remain a pub-
lic good. As I claimed elsewhere (Möller, 2011), the CA-problem could be transformed into a 
coordination problem that can be solved when the risk of punishment for organizing protests 
is sufficiently low. By using the internet to organize protests, the risk is very low. Regarding 
the Arab countries, the proportion of internet users in the poor countries of the NP-Subgroup 
is very low (Somalia: 1.1 percent, Chad: 1.2 percent, the Comoros: 3.6 percent, and Eritrea: 
4.1 percent). By contrast, the proportion of internet users in the P-Subgroup is much higher 
(18 percent on average). This finding supports the thesis I proposed. 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper introduces a general cause-and-effect mechanism for vote outs and revolu-
tions, which consists of a necessary and a sufficient condition. This mechanism is confirmed 
and supported by the data. Because the sufficient condition (namely the solution of the CA-
problem) is always satisfied in democracies, the probability of a deselection depends on eco-
nomic performance. I analyzed whether the total average deviation of the rGDPc from the 
production potential in the years before an election has an impact on the reelection probabili-
ty. The empirical results reveal that it does have an impact; the greater the deviation (i.e. the 
worse the economic situation), the more likely is a vote out. This statement applies to the Eu-
ropean democracies, which are the countries I considered. Hence, I have found significant 
support of the existence of economic voting.  
In dictatorships, by contrast, it is the sufficient condition that prevents revolutions. For 
this reason, the total average deviation should have no effect on the likelihood of a revolution. 
The analysis of the Arab World indeed shows that the probability of protests or revolutionary 
events is not influenced by the total average deviation of the rGDPc from the production po-
tential. Thus, I find no evidence for economic revolutionizing in the Arab World sample.  
Moreover, a more detailed analysis of the Arab Spring shows that economic reasons are not 
the only ones for the protests that occurred in many Arab countries. Besides economic causes, 
other factors, such as internet access
15, also play a decisive role. If not, people in every other 
authoritarian and poor country would sooner or later take to the streets.  
One should rather examine the influence of the secret service and take the degree of 
repression and the population structure into account. Unfortunately, a broad analysis would 
                                                 
15 Because the internet might provide a solution for the coordination problem. 20 
acquire extensive data, which is not available. In determining which factors cause political 
protest, it would be useful to take a closer look at the conditions in countries like Russia, Chi-
na or smaller countries in this region (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and so on). 
 
References 
Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective. Electoral 
Studies, 19, pp. 151-170. 
Anderson,  C.  J.,  Lewis-Beck,  M.  S.,  &  Stegmair,  M.  (2000).  Post-socialist  democratization:  A 
comparative political economy model of the vote for Hungary and Nicaragua. Lviv, Ukraine: 
Studiji Politolohichnoho Tsentru Geneza. 
Assaad, R., & Roudi-Fahimi, F. (2007). Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic 
Opportunity or Challenge? Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau. 
Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, pp. 1-27. 
Bloch, P. C. (1986). The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments. Public Choice, 51, 
pp. 117-128. 
Breisinger,  C.,  Ecker,  O.,  &  Al-Riffai,  P.  (2011).  Economics  of  the  Arab  Awakening:  From 
Revolution to Transformation and Food Security. IFPRI Policy Brief, 18. International Food 
Policy Research Institut (IFPRI). 
Chappell,  H.  W.,  &  Veiga,  L.  (1998).  Economics  and  Elections  in  Western  Europe:  1960-1997. 
Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), pp. 183-197. 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Fair, R. (1978). The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 60(2), pp. 159-173. 
Fidrmuc, J. (2000). Economics of voting in post-communist countries. Electoral Studies, 19(2-3), pp. 
199-217. 
Freedom  House.  (2011).  Freedom  in  the  World  Country  Ratings  [FIWAIIScoresCountries1973-
2011.xls]. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. 
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hanelt, C.-P., & Bauer, M. (2011). Arabien zwischen Revolution und Repression. spotlight europe 
2011/03, Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2011). Penn World Tables Version 7.0. Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
Key, V. O. (1964). Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell. 5th edition. 
Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior,1896-1964. The American 
Political Science Review, 65(1), pp. 131-143. 21 
Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1988). Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University Michigan Press. 
Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Mitchell, G. (1990). Modelos transnacionales de voto economico: Estudio de un 
conjunto de paises europeos. Revista del Instituto de Estudios Economicos, 4, pp. 65-81. 
Lewis-Beck, M., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 3, pp. 183-219. 
Lipset,  S.  M.  (1959).  Some  social  requisites  of  democracy:  Economic  development  and  political 
legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1). 
Minier, J. A. (2001). Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic Movements. Southern 
Economic Journal, 67(4), pp. 996-1009. 
Mirkin,  B.  (2010).  Population  Levels,  Trends  and  Policies  in  the  Arab  Region:  Challenges  and 
Opportunities. Arab Human Development, Report Paper 01. 
Möller,  M.  (2011).  Gefangen  im  Dilemma?  Ein  strategischer  Ansatz  der  Wahl-  und 
Revolutionsteilnahme. ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 62. 
Mueller,  J.  (1970).  Presidential  popularity  from  Truman  to  Johnson.  American  Political  Science 
Review, 64, pp. 18-23. 
Nannestad,  P.,  &  Paldam,  M.  (1994).  The  VP-Function:  A  survey  of  the  literature  on  vote  and 
popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice, 79(3-4), pp. 213-245. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), pp. 169-
190. 
Nordsiek,  W.  (2011).  Parties  and  Elections  in  Europe.  Retrieved  August  1,  2011,  from 
http://www.parties-and-elections.de/countries.html 
Olsson-Yahouzis, N. (2010). Revolutionaries, despots and rationality. Rationality and Society, 22(3), 
pp. 283-299. 
Pacek, A. C. (1994). Macroeconomic conditions and electoral politics in East Central Europe. The 
American Journal of Political Science, 38, pp. 723-744. 
Pacek, A., & Radcliff, B. (1995). The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing 
World. American Journal of Political Science, 39, pp. 745-759. 
Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study of seventeen nations over four decades. 
In  H.  Norporth,  M.  S.  Lewis-Beck,  &  J.  D.  Lafay  (Eds.),  Economics  and  Politics.  The 
Calculus of Support (pp. 9-32). Ann Arbor, MI: University Michigan Press. 
Powell,  B.,  &  Whitten,  G.  D.  (1993).  A  Cross-National  Analysis  of  Economic  Voting:  Taking 
Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), pp. 391-414. 
Schelling, T. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Skocpol, T. (1985). States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China. Cambridge. 
Tufte, E. (1978). Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 22 
Tullock, G. (1971). The paradox of revolution. Public Choice, 11(1), pp. 89-99. 
Urdal, H. (2004). The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed 
Conflict, 1950-2000. Social Development Paper No. 68. 
Wilkin, S., Haller, B., & Norporth, H. (1997). Argentinia to Zambia: A world-wide test of economic 







No-Protest-Subgroup  Protest-Subgroup 
country  Index  Index  country 
Chad  -2  2  Algeria 
Comoros  9  -7  Bahrain 
Eritrea  -7  2  Djibouti 
Lebanon  7  -3  Egypt 
Qatar  -10  1  Iraq 
Somalia  -7  -3  Jordan 
United Arab Emirates  -8  -7  Kuwait 
    -7  Libya 
    -5  Mauretanien 
   
6  Morocco 
    -8  Oman 
   
-10  Saudi Arabia 
    -4  Sudan 
   
-7  Syria 
   
-4  Tunisia 
   
-2  Yemen 
Mean  -2,571429  -1,428571  Mean 
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